Ядерные силы 1985

16. Congressional Record, 12 April 1984, pp. 4638-41; Department of Defense Authorization Act 1985, Conference Report, 98-1080, 26 September 1984, pp. 99-101.

17. SASC, FY 1985 DoD (note 14), p. 3419.

18. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, FY 1984 Research and Development Program, A Summary Description, April 1983, pp. 3-4.

19. Getler, M., 'British-based US planes keep watch', Washington Post, 31 December 1984, p. A10.

20. Markham, J. M., '3 Gls die at German base when missile catches fire', New York Times, 12 January 1985, p. 3; Drozdiak, W., 'US missile unit likes Pershing 11', Washington Post, ll November 1984, p. AI; Pincus, W., 'Pershing lis deployed faster than expected', Washington Post, 3 October 1984, p. A31. For a description of Pershing 11 operations, see Sankner, R. and Norris, P. H., 'One up on la', Field Artillery Journal, July-August 1984, pp. 16-19.

21. DoD Authorization Act 1985 (note 16), pp. 165-66.

22. SASC, FY 1985 DoD (note 14), p. 3634.

23. In addition, reports are required on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements; the requirements and costs of measures to verify compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (due on 15 March 1985); the adequacy of current US chemical stockpiles; and the need for production of new binary weapons (l April 1985). See DoD Authorization Act 1985 (note 16), pp. 19-20, 94-102, 141-42, 315-16.

24. House Armed Services Committee, FY 1985 DoD, Part 4, pp. 1097-164; SASC, FY 1985 DoD (note 14), Part 6; House Appropriations Committee, FY 1985 DoD, Part 5, pp. 665-955; Senate Appropriations Committee, FY 1985 DoD, Part 3, pp. 289-373; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Strategic Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons, Senate hearing 98-750; House Foreign Affairs Committee, Arms Control in Outer Space.

25. President's Commission on Strategic Forces, 21 March 1984, p. 8.

26. Carter, A. B., Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, Background Paper, Office of Technology Assessment, 1984.

27. Extensive coverage of the reports was first given in Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 October 1983, pp. 16-18; 24 October, 1983, pp. 50-57; and 31 October 1983, pp. 74-78. For portions of the reports and summaries, see SFRC (note 24), pp. 94-175.

28. Science, 4 November 1984, p. 673.

29. Oberdorfer, D., 'Ex Defense Chief calls "Star Wars" unrealistic', Washington Post, 15 December 1984, p. Al4. Articles supporting and criticizing the scientific feasibility of develop ing a space-based ballistic missile defence system multiplied during 1984. See, for instance, Bethe, H. A., Garwin, R. L., Gottfried, K. and Kendall, H. W., 'Space-based ballistic missile defense', Scientific American, October 1984, pp. 39-49; Drell, S. D. and Panofsky, W. K. H., 'The case against strategic defense: technical and strategic realities', Issues in Science and Technology, Falll984, pp. 45-65; Drell, S., Farley, P. J. and Holloway, D., 'Preserving the ABM initiative', International Security, Fall 1984, pp. 51-91; Fletcher, J. C., 'The technologies for ballistic missile defense', Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1984, pp. 15-29; Jastrow, R., 'Reagan vs. the scientists: why the president is right about missile defense', Commentary, January 1984, pp. 23-32; Orbis, summer 1984, whole issue; Payne, K. B. and Gray, C. S., 'Nuclear policy and the defensive transition', Foreign Affairs, spring 1984, pp. 820-42. An extensive treatment of Star Wars impact on the ABM Treaty is given in: Longstreth, T. K. and Pike, J. E., A Report on the Impact of United States and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty, June 1984. A good introduction to the subject is Carter, A. B. and Schwartz, D. N. (eds), Ballistic Missile Defense (Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1984).

30. Broad, W. J., 'Reduced goal set on Reagan's plan for space defense', New York Times, 23 December 1984, p. l.

31. Yost, D.S, 'European anxieties about ballistic missile defense', Washington Quarterly, Fall 1984.

32. Indications of a Soviet numerical advantage were first mentioned in 1983 Congressional testimony by Dr Richard Wagner (Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1984, Department of Energy, p. 19), but were contradicted by testimony of Mr Perle the same year (House Foreign Affairs Committee, Call for a Mutual and Verifiable Freeze on and Reductions in Nuclear Weapons, 1983, p. 45). A clear portrayal of a Soviet advantage of roughly 25 per cent appeared in figures accompanying 1984 testimony by Dr Wagner and Mr Weinberger (see note 9, p. liS; and SASC, FY 1985 DoD, Part I, p. 123, respectively). Mr Reagan confirmed this advantage on 10 June in London (Kaplan, F., Boston Globe, 18 June 1984, p. 1), as did Mr Weinberger soon thereafter (CBS Morning News, 18 June 1984, manuscript p. 7).

33. Two charts presented by Dr Wagner and Mr Weinberger conflict, with Dr Wagner's indicating 1978 and Mr Weinberger's 1975 as the cross-over point (see note 32). For estimates of the historical US arsenal, see Cochran, T. B., Arkin, W. M. and Hoenig, M. H., The Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume I, US Nuclear Weapons and Capabilities (Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 14-15.

34. See Arkin, W. M. and Sands, J. 1., 'The Soviet nuclear stockpile', Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 5, June 1984.

35. Department of Defense, Defense/84, May 1984, p. 5.

36. The President's Report on Continuing the Acquisition of the Peacekeeper (MX) Missile, March 1985, p. 2. The USSR reported in 1982 that the SS-X-24 would be the single new type of ICBM allowed under the SALT II agreement, and in response to US charges that the SS-X-25 is a new missile, the USSR indicated that it is a modification of the SS-13. Available evidence does not permit an unambiguous determination of whether the SS-X-25 is a new missile as defined by SALT Il, although it is expected to feature significantly improved capabilities over the SS-13.

37. See, for example, Agres, T., 'Soviets testing new ICBMs, CIA reports', Washington Times, 18 September 1984, p. l.

38. See note 37; and Corddry, C. W., 'Soviets believed developing giant intercontinental missile', Baltimore Sun, 13 May 1984, p. 1

39. See note 35. When the third Typhoon Class submarine enters operational service, two Yankee Class submarines will be removed from service as strategic missile submarines, thus reducing the number of strategic missile submarines to 61 and the number of SLBMs to 924. However, the number of warheads on deployed submarines will increase. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, FY 1986, p. 19, this change may have already taken place.

40. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (1984), pp. 25-26; Defense Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Communist Naval Orders of Battle, May 1984, p. I.

41. The President's Report (note 36), p. 2; DoD, 1984 (note 40), p. 25; House Armed Services Committee, FY 1985 DoD, Part 1, p. 770; Defense/84 (note 35, p. 9). Delta Class submarines moved into the North Atlantic in January 1984 as part of the response to US INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) deployments (House Armed Services Committee, FY 1985 DoD, Part 3, p. 3).

42. Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1983, Part 9, p. 203.

43. Fifteen Bear Hs were reported to be in service in mid-1984 by Lt General James A. Williams, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in 'The Soviet strategic threat' (note 35), p. 10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff FY 1986 statement notes 120 Bears and 45 Bisons as deployed (p. 19), thus indicating that 20 Bear Hs have been deployed.

44. The President's Report (note 36), pp. 2-3. The Soviet Ministry of Defence announced on 13 October 1984 that new long-range cruise missiles on "strategic bombers and submarines" had begun to be deployed (Doder, D., 'Soviets say new cruise deployed', Washington Post, 14 October 1984, p. 1). US intelligence believes these missiles to be the AS-15 on the Bear H bomber, and the SS-N-21 aboard attack submarines.

45. Press statement by the Chairman of the Standing Consultative Group, NATO Press Release, Brussels, 9 January 1985. The Soviet denial of additional deployments in 1984 was made in October in response to statements by Mr Weinberger that "substantial numbers" of additional SS-20 missiles are operational. See New York Times, 12 October 1984, p. A3; and 13 October 1984, p. A3.

46. Note 42.

47. NATO, NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons, 1984, pp. 36-40; Joint Chiefs of Staff, FY 1986, pp. 40-41, 46.

48. Note 42, p. 197.

49. DoD, 1984 (note 40), pp. 30-31; Williams (note 43), p. 11.

50. House Arined Services Committee, FY 1984 RDT&E, Part 5, pp. 232, 247; Aviation Week & Space Technology, 23 July 1984, p. 16; Pincus, W., 'US eyes Soviet rate of making bombers', Washington Post, 22 December 1984, p. A18.

51. DoD, 1984 (note 40), p. 55.

52. International Defense Review, No. 6, 1984, p. 685.

53. Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 August 1984, pp. 171-73.

54. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1984, Vol. 1 (HMSO, London, 1984), p. 24.

55. 'French propose defense budget of $15.8 billion for next year', Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 October 1984, pp. 29-30.

56. 'French government defines nuclear aircraft carrier', Aviation Week & Space Technology, 26 November 1984, p. 61

57. New York Times, 2 October 1984; Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 October 1984.

58. Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 August 1984, p. 223; New York Post (Reuters), 13 June 1984.

59. Note 42, p. 104.

60. House Armed Services Committee, FY 1985 DoD, Part 2, p. 371.

61. House Armed Services Committee, FY 1985 DoD, Part 3, pp. 754-55.

62. Note 60, p. 361.

63. House Armed Services Committee, FY 1980 DoD, Part 3, p. 755.

64. Note 60, p. 373.

65. Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1983 DoD, Part 5, p. 3083.

66. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, FY 1984 AC1S, p. 142.

67. Senate Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Modernization Programs, Hearings, 1981, p. 203.

68. Note 67, p. 170.

69. The President's Report (note 36), p. 2; see also note 44.

70. Statement of Rear Admiral John L. Butts, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower and Force Projection Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 February 1985, p. 10.

71. See Arkin, W. M., 'Flying in the face of arms control', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1984.

72. As Admiral Hostettler said in 1984, "By placing this versatile family of weapons on a wide variety of surface ships and submarines, we multiply our offensive force capability...It complicates Soviet planning by requiring them to consider every battlegroup ship a potential threat." House Armed Services Committee, FY 1985 DoD, Part 2, p. 372.

ИСТОЧНИК: SIPRY-1985